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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: HOUSING PART R
-------------------------------------------------------x
327-333 E. 90 REALTY LLC

Index No. 65767/2019

Petitioner-Landlord,
Against
Mark S. Weinstein
Respondent-Tenant.
---------------------------------------------------------x
HON. ANNE KATZ
In this nonpayment proceeding petitioner seeks possession of 327 E.90th Street, New York, New
York 10128 (“premises”). The petition alleges the premises are exempt from “Rent Control, NYC
Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 as Amended or the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974
because the premises became vacant after April 1, 1994 and the vacancy rent was $2,000.00 or
more”. The petition also alleges that respondent, Mark S. Weinstein, is in possession of the
premises pursuant to a written lease in which respondent promised to pay petitioner $2,895.00 as
monthly rent.
On July 16, 2019, petitioner served respondent with a “Notice to Tenant” which required
respondent to pay $5,562.50 as rental arrears through July, 2019. Respondent failed to make
payment and petitioner commenced this proceeding by Notice of Petition and Petition dated
August 7, 2019. Respondent submitted a pro se Answer, dated August 23, 2019. The Answer
alleged a general denial. The proceeding was returnable in Part D on September 5, 2019. On
December 20, 2019 the proceeding was transferred to Part R for trial. A trial was conducted on
February 19, 2020.
On February 24, 2020, the instant Order to Show Cause was filed by newly retained counsel for
respondent. Respondent was referred to Mobilization for Justice through the Assigned Counsel
Program. Respondent now seeks permission for leave to amend his pro se Answer pursuant to
CPLR 3025(b). Respondent also seeks leave to conduct limited discovery under CPLR Ş408.
Lastly, respondent requests a stay of this proceeding pending discovery, together with any other
relief this Court deems proper.

1

Amended Answer-General
Respondent argues that CPLR 3025(b) directs that leave to amend an answer shall be freely granted
absent significant prejudice to the opposing party Edenwald Contracting v. New York, 60 NY2d
957, 471 NYS2d 55 (1983). Moreover, respondent argues that when the pleadings at issue are
prepared by a pro se litigant, it is appropriate for the court to allow an amendment of the pro se
Answer. 153 Street Apartment LLC. v. Alveranga, 30 Misc3d 129 ( 958 NYS2d 647 (App. Term 1st
Dept 2010). Lastly, respondent argues that the proposed amendments are meritorious and do not
pose any prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner argues that respondent should not be granted leave to amend his pro se Answer.
Petitioner argues that respondent’s alleged new defenses are “palpably without merit” and
prejudicial Gordon v. Oster, 36 AD3d 525 (1st Dept, 2007).
First & Second Affirmative Defenses - Regulatory Status/Overcharge
As First and Second Affirmative Defenses, respondent alleges the premises are subject to the Rent
Stabilization Law and Code; respondent has been overcharged; and the petition must be dismissed
because it does not reflect the correct regulatory status of the premises. According to respondent,
a review of the rent regulatory history shows that in 2008 the owner purported to effectuate a
deregulation of the premises via “high rent vacancy decontrol”. Respondent alleges the high
vacancy decontrol was illegal because, during the time the premises was deregulated, petitioner
was in receipt of a J-51 tax abatement. Therefore, according to respondent, the premises should
have been stabilized. NYC Admin. Code 26-504.2(a); Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props, L.P. 13
NY3d 270, 890 NYS2d 388 (2009). Respondent also argues that his rent should be frozen at the last
registered rent in 2005 and be brought back under the auspices of rent stabilization Moore v.
Greystone Props, 81 LLC, 176 AD3d 516, 108 NYS3d (AD1, 2019). Additionally, respondent
argues that as petitioner illegally deregulated the premises during receipt of J-51 benefits,
respondent believes he has a claim for rent overcharge.
Respondent also points out that a review of the rent registrations for the premises demonstrates
that between 2004 and 2005 the registered rent for the premises increased from $1,135.17 to
$1,735.00. This increase was approximately a 53% increase in rent. A review of the rent guidelines
shows that in 2005 petitioner was only allowed to take a 17% vacancy increase. Therefore,
respondent also challenges the unexplained 36% increase which petitioner took in 2005.
Petitioner argues that respondent’s First and Second Affirmative Defenses are without merit.
Petitioner argues that respondent moved into the premises in 2014, after expiration of the J-51
benefit and rejects respondent’s argument that its failure to register the premises in 2009, 2010 and
2011 dictate that respondent is only required to pay the last registered rent. In support of its
argument, petitioner cites the case of BLDG Management Co., Inc. v. Orelli (AT 1st Dept, 2018).
In Orelli, supra, the tenant moved into his apartment after the expiration of J-51 benefit and
deregulation of the apartment. In that case, the landlord reevaluated the regulatory status of the
apartment, after the Roberts decision was issued, using the rent stabilization guidelines. In Orelli
,after the new calculations were done, the landlord concluded the rent was still over $2,000.00.
Despite the landlord’s new calculations, the lower court held that based upon the owner’s failure
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to register the apartment, he could only charge the last regulated rent with no increases. On appeal,
the Appellate Term reversed the lower court’s decision. The Appellate Term held that because the
rent calculations showed the rent exceeded the $2,000.00 threshold for deregulation, the apartment
was properly deregulated, and the increases were proper. Petitioner further argues that its absence
of rent registrations for its former tenants does not affect the rent or status of respondent, who
moved in after the expiration of the J-51 benefit. Petitioner alleges that the additional 35% increase
was based upon Individual Apartment Improvements (“IAIs”) it performed at the premises. Based
upon the foregoing, petitioner argues that respondents First and Second Proposed Affirmative
Defenses are specious and without merit.
This Court finds respondent’ First and Second Affirmative Defenses have merit. It is undisputed
that petitioner received a J-51 benefit from 2001 through 2011 and despite receipt of the J-51
benefit the premises were deregulated in 2008 and never re-registered as stabilized in accordance
with Roberts, supra; Gersten v. 56 7th Ave. LLC 88 AD3d 189, 928 NYS2d 515 (App. Div. 1st Dept
2011). This Court distinguishes this proceeding from Orelli because in Orelli the Court found
petitioner had a good faith explanation why the premises were not registered. In this proceeding,
petitioner has failed to offer any explanation for its failure to register the premises. Moreover,
under these circumstances, it is apparent that any prejudice which may occur to petitioner is
outweighed by the prejudice caused to respondent if petitioner unlawfully deregulated the
premises. This Court must make note of the recent Court of Appeals decision in In the Matter of
Regina Metropolitan Co., v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, --N.E.
3d, 2020 WL 1557900, 2020 Sip. Op. 02127 (Ct. App April 2, 2020 which does not alter the
respondent’s right to amend his answer to include his defenses based upon petitioner’s alleged
illegal deregulation of the premises and overcharge.
Third Affirmative Defense-Service
Respondent alleges it must be allowed to amend its Answer to include defective service of the
Notice of Petition and Petition. Respondent alleges that based upon defective service this
proceeding must be dismissed. Respondent alleges that service is defective because petitioner’s
process server failed to make reasonable attempts to effectuate personal service since both attempts
made to effectuate personal service were made about the same time each day.
A review of the Affidavit of Service shows that reasonable attempts were made. To constitute
“reasonable” one attempt at service must be during working hours and the other made during nonworking hours. MK Secure Holdings LLC v. Chen (App. Term 1st Dept) 2018 Slip Op. 50719. In
the case at bar, the first attempt was made on Saturday at 3:00 pm (non-working hours) and the
second attempt was made on Monday at 1:29 pm (working hours). Accordingly, service was
proper, and respondent may not assert his Third Affirmative Defense.

First Counterclaim- Breach of the Warranty of Habitability
Respondent alleges that he has experienced months without heat, holes in the bathroom ceiling
and leaks, and a hole in a large portion of the premises ceiling in violation of NY Real Property
Law 235-b. If respondent proves these conditions existed, that petitioner was aware of the
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conditions and failed to cure the conditions, the counterclaim is inextricably intertwined to the
underlying nonpayment proceeding and appropriate. Generally, “a counterclaim is permissible if
it is inextricably intertwined to the landlord's entitlement to rent or possession of subject apartment
of the underlying proceeding.” (Wai Chan v. Gao Xiao Ying, 10 Misc.3d 1065[A], 2005 N.Y. Slip
Op 52166[U], *3 [Hous Part, Civil Ct, N.Y. County Dec. 23, 2005]. Clearly the warranty of
habitability is intertwined to petitioner’s claim for rent.
Second Affirmative Defense-Overcharge
Respondent alleges that he has been overcharged based upon the illegal deregulation of the
premises during receipt of a J-51 benefit. As stated above, counterclaims that are inextricably
intertwined to the underlying nonpayment proceeding because they go directly to the landlord
entitlement to rent and/or possession are appropriate. Wai Chan, supra. It is clear that an
overcharge defense and counterclaim is on direct point with the petitioner’s ability to collect rent
in this proceeding. Ying, 10 Misc.3d 1065[A], 2005 N.Y. Slip Op 52166[U], *3 [Hous Part, Civil
Ct, N.Y. County.

Third Counterclaim- Legal Fees
Respondent’s counterclaim for legal fees is also appropriate. Generally, courts will enforce lease
provisions which preclude a tenant from interposing a counterclaim unless
the counterclaim is inextricably intertwined with the landlord's entitlement to rent or possession of
premises.” Wai Chan, supra. Although such a provision exists in the lease herein, respondent’s
counterclaim for legal fees is inextricably intertwined to the underlying proceeding. Paragraph 18
of the lease allows petitioner to recover attorneys ‘fees. As such, respondent may be entitled to the
reciprocal right to recover attorneys’ fees under Real Property Law Section 234, if he is the
prevailing party. Accordingly, the counterclaim is appropriate and not prejudicial.
Discovery
Respondent seeks leave of this Court to conduct limited discovery. Respondent argues it is well
settled that where the regulatory status of an apartment is at issue, discovery is necessary and
appropriate Mautner-Glick Corp. V. Higgins, 2019 NY Slip Op 2929 (App. Term 1st Dept 2019. NY
Slip. Op. 52097(U), 66 Misc3d 132(A) (App. Term 1st Dept 2019).
Petitioner argues discovery is not appropriate and has agreed to provide the records in its
possession with regard to rent history and the IAI’s. Petitioner argues that respondent’s request for
discovery should be denied because the rent in 2005 was legal and reliable.
This Court finds that respondent has proved “ample need” for discovery. New York University v.
Farkas, 121 Misc2d 643, 468 NYS2d 808 (Civ. Ct 1983). In accordance with the requirements
espoused in Farkas, supra. respondent has articulated a cause of action for overcharge, the
information is within petitioner’s exclusive control and/or knowledge and based upon the facts
presented herein this Court is satisfied that respondent’s request for discovery is not a fishing
expedition. A review of The Proposed Notice to Produce reveals the discovery requests are
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narrowly tailored to the issue of the J-51 abatement and IAI’s. No prejudice will occur to petitioner
by this Order since the Court directs all discovery to be complete within 30 day of receipt of this
Decision.
Respondent also alleges the HSTPA, passed in June, 2019, changed the process and standards by
which a tenant could challenge the regulatory status of an apartment and courts have applied the
HTSPA to allow a tenant, asserting an overcharge claim, to conduct discovery. Widsam Realty
Corp. v Joyner, 2019. The recent Court of Appeal decision, In the Matter of Regina Metropolitan
Co., v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, supra. made it clear that
Part F of the Housing Tenant Protection and Stability Act, which addresses overcharge calculations
and treble damages may not be applied retroactively or to pending cases. Therefore, it is not relevant
to the case at bar. However, it is clear that current public policy favors an expansion of tenants’
rights with regard to deregulation and J-51 benefits. Thus, since respondent meets the six-prong
test as set forth in Farkas, supra., and in keeping with current public policy, this Court finds
discovery is appropriate under the circumstances herein.

Conclusion
Accordingly, respondent is granted leave to amend his Answer to include his First and Second
Affirmative Defenses and First, Second and Third Counterclaims. Respondent is denied leave to
amend his Answer to include his Third Affirmative Defense. Respondent’s request for discovery
is granted and all discovery must be complete within 30 days. This constitutes the Decision and
Order of this Court.
This proceeding may be restored by motion or stipulation upon the completion of discovery.
Dated: Nassau, New York
April 17, 2020
______________________________
Hon. Anne Katz
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